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SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES TO FINE AND IMPRISONMENT

FRANCIS J. MERCFRET*
After reviewing the sentencing process from sentencing by the
judge through appellate review, this commentary focuses on possible solutions to current problems. The commentator suggests
several changes that should result in more uniform applicationof
sentencing. Also, several alternative processes are reviewed and
recommended for adoption.
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INTRODUCTION

The system by which criminal defendants in the United States
are sentenced is rigid and undisciplined. In imposing sentences, the
options of a trial judge are limited to fine, imprisonment, probation,
or, at times, medical treatment. Within those options, however,
trial judges have almost full discretion.
This article focuses on various aspects of the sentencing system.
The options open to the sentencing judge, the process of selecting a
sentence and appellate review, lack of uniformity, judicial discretion, and probation in Florida are discussed. The final portion attempts to highlight some of the factors which serve to detract from
the effectiveness of probation and then offers suggestions for reform.
II.
A.

THE JUDGE'S OPTIONS
The Statutory Sentence

The most obvious sentence which a judge may impose on one
convicted of violating a criminal statute is the sentence, if any,
specified in the statute itself. The statutory penalty may be speci* Former member, University of Miami Law Review.
1. "Violation of this section shall be punishable by ....

"
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fled directly' or indirectly.2 Statutory sentences are almost exclusively fine, imprisonment, or both. Other alternatives are quite rare.
Where alternatives exist they supplement rather than replace fine
or imprisonment. Additional penalties may include forfeiture of
contraband, 3 loss of a position of trust,' payment of the costs of
2. "Violation of this section shall be a crime of the nth degree," where the punishment
for such crimes is specified in a general punishment statute. Typical of general punishment
statutes are the following:
(1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by
life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before
becoming eligible for parole unless the proceeding held to determine sentence
according to the procedure set forth in 921.141 results in findings by the court that
such person shall be punished by death, and in the latter event such person shall
be punished by death.
(2) In the event the death penalty in a capital felony is held to be unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, the
court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death for a capital
felony shall cause such person to be brought before the court, and the court shall
sentence such person to life imprisonment as provided in subsection (1).
(3) A person who has been convicted of any other designated felony may be
punished as follows:
(a) For a life felony, by a term of imprisonment for life or for a term
of years not less than 30;
(b) For a felony of the first degree, by a term of imprisonment not
exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment;
(c) For a felony of the second degree, by a term of imprisonment not
exceeding 15 years;
(d) For a felony of the third degree, by a term of imprisonment not
exceeding 5 years.
(4) A person who has been convicted of a designated misdemeanor may be
sentenced as follows:
(a) For a misdemeanor of the first degree, by a definite term of
imprisonment not exceeding 1 year;
(b) For a misdemeanor of the second degree, by a definite term of
imprisonment not exceeding 60 days.
(5) Any person who has been convicted of a [non-criminal] violation may not
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment nor to any other punishment more severe
than a fine, forfeiture, or other civil penalty, except as provided in chapter 316,
Florida Statutes, or by ordinance of any city or county.
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the operation of any
statute of this state authorizing a trial court, in its discretion, to impose a sentence of imprisonment for an indeterminate period within minimum and maximum limits as provided by law, except as provided in subsection (1).
(7) This section does not deprive the court of any authority conferred by law to
decree a forfeiture of property, suspend or cancel a license, remove a person from
office, or impose any other civil penalty. Such a judgment or order may be included in the sentence.
FLA. STAT. § 775.082 (1975) (footnote omitted).
3. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 492 (1970) (counterfeit plates); 18 U.S.C. § 3615 (1970) (liquor); FLA.
STAT. § 790.08(2) (1975) (weapons).
4. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970) (disclosure of confidential information); 18 U.S.C. §
2071(b) (1970) (mutilation of documents).
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prosecution, or injunction against continuing the unlawful activities.' Such penalties are often considered civil in nature and sometimes are imposed in a separate proceeding.7
B.

Suspension of Sentence

A judge may suspend the imposition of sentence in many
states, 8 or he may suspend its execution9 or both. 0 At least one state
permits adjudication of guilt to be withheld entirely so that the
question of formal sentencing is never reached." In many jurisdictions the power to suspend is limited by statute when certain crimes
or defendants are involved. Typical restrictions are those which
forbid the suspension of sentences of capital offenders," or "habitual criminals," but there are many local peculiarities with which
4
courts must contend.
C.

Probation

When a sentence has been suspended or an adjudication withheld, the defendant may simply be released. Frequently, however,
the defendant is placed on probation. Some states make probation
mandatory if the defendant is not to be imprisoned or punished
entirely by fine. 5 Probation is defined in a variety of ways by the
various jurisdictions, but their common theme is supervision by a
probation department of some kind. One of the more concise statutory definitions is that used in Illinois: "'Probation' means a sentence or adjudication of conditional and revocable release under the
supervision of a probation officer."' 6 The states generally do not
5. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.48 (1964).
6. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 709 (1970); FLA. STAT. §§ 817.416(4), .415(7), .561 (1975) (false
advertising).
7. FLA. STAT. § 775.04 (1975) defines violation of a statute punished by statutory payment of damages or reparation to the victim to be no crime at all.
8. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1657 (1956).
9. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 42 § 19 (1958); IDAHO CODE § 19-2601 (Supp. 1975).
10. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.080 (1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2324 (1964); DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 11, § 4204 (1975); KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 62-2239 (1964).
11. FLA. STAT. § 948.01(3) (1975).
12. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 42 § 19 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2331 (Supp. 1975); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 47-7-33 (1972); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.185 (1975).

13. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(d)(4) (1976).
14. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:62.1 (West 1974) bars probation or suspension of
sentence for one convicted of burglary of a pharmacy, but there is no bar to such relief for
more serious offenses. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 1005-5-3(d) (1973) forbids suspension of sentence for marijuana offenders.
15. See, e.g, FLA. STAT. § 948.01(5) (1975).
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 1005-1-18 (1973).
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distinguish between a suspended sentence and probation because
the terms are often used together. 7 The term "probation" will be
used here to imply suspension of sentence, or where appropriate,
withholding of adjudication.
Every state has a probation statute" as does the federal
government.' 9 Also, all of America's Territories," Trusts,' Commonwealths2 and zones 3 have probation statutes. Some of these
17. But see GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2714 (1972).
18. ALA. CODE tit. 42, §§ 19-28 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.080 et seq. (1972); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1657 (1956), as amended, Ariz. Laws ch. 134 § 3 (Arizona Legislative Service
1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2324 et seq. (1964), aa amended, (Supp. 1975); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203 et seq. (West 1970), as amended, § 1203 et seq. (West Supp. 1975); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-11-201 et seq. (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a.28 et seq. (1972), as amended,
(Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4301 et seq. (1974), as amended, § 4302 et seq. (Supp.
1975); FLA. STAT. § 948.01 et seq. (1972), as amended, (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2702 et
seq. (1972); HAWAII PENAL CODE § 620 et seq. (1972), as amended, Session Law 1973, c.136,
§5; IDAHO CODE § 19-2601 et seq. (Supp. 1975); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1 etseq. (1973),
as amended, P.A. 78-939, § 1, eff. July 1, 1974; IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 35-7-1-1 et seq. (Burns
1975), as amended, (Supp. 1 1976); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 247.26, .27 (1969), as amended, §§
247.27, .40 (Supp. 1975); KA. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4602 to 03, 21-4610 to 13 (1974), as amended,
chap. 339 Session Laws of Kan. (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 435A.1-040, 435A.2-010 et seq.
(Baldwin 1974); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 893 et seq. (West 1967), as amended, art. 893
et seq. (West Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 1201 et seq. (Supp. 1976); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641 et seq. (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 83 et seq., ch. 279,
§§ 1, 1A, 3, 4, 43A (1972), as amended, ch. 276, § 83 et seq., ch. 279, § 1, 1A, 3 (Supp. 1976);
MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 771.1 et seq. (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.13, .135, .14, 636.01
et seq. (1964), as amended, §§ 609.13, .135, .14, 636.01 et seq. (1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 477-1 et seq. (1972), as amended, § 47-7-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 549.010 et
seq. (Vernon 1953), as amended, (Vernon Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-3201 et
seq. (Supp. 1975); NE3. REV. STAT. § 29-2209 et seq. (1943), as amended, (Supp. 1973), as
amended, § 29-2262 et seq. (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.175 et seq. (1973); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 504.1 et seq. (1968), as amended, § 504.8 et seq. (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A: 168-1 et seq. (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-17-14 et seq. (1972), as amended, (Supp.
1975); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 410.10 et seq. (McKinney 1972), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15.197 et seq. (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-53-01 et. seq. (1960),
as amended, (Supp. 1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.01 et seq. (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 991(a)-(e), 994 (Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.530 et seq. (1975); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 1051 et seq. (1962), as amended, §§ 1052, 1082 (Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 12-18-1 to -4, 12-19-8 to -17 (1969), as amended, §§ 12-19-8, -9, -13, -14 (Supp. 1975);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-556 et seq. (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-57-1 et seq. (1967),
as amended, § 23-57-4 et seq. (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2901 et seq. (1975); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 42.12, .13 (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 28, § 1201 et seq. (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-230 et seq. (1974); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 9.92.060, 9.95.200 et seq. (1961), as amended, (Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6212-1 et seq. (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 973.09 et seq. (1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-318 et seq.
(1959), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1975).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 et seq. (1970), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3651 et seq. (Supp. 1976);
D.C. Code Encyl. Ann. § 24-103 et seq. (1967).
20. AM. SAMOA CODE tit. 28 § 1-10 (1973); GUAM PENAL CODE § 1231 et seq. (1970); V. I.
CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 3711 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
21. TRUST TERRITORY CODE tit. 11 § 1459 (1970).
22. P. R. LAWS ANN. tit. 34, § 1026 et seq. (1971), as amended, § 1027-29 (Supp. 1975).
23. C. Z. CODE tit. 6, §§ 4491-92, 4511-12 (1963).

19771

SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES

statutes are vague and provide little or no guidance to the court in
administering them,24 while others go into minute detail. 5 All of
these statutes indicate that probation is a conditional privilege for
which the court sets the conditions. The language of 18 U.S.C. section 3651 is typical. It permits probation "upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems best."2 Certain conditions are used
so widely that they have become "boiler plate" in state statutes and
on various probation offices' forms. 7 In addition to these boiler plate
conditions, the courts can apply specialized conditions tailored to
the defendant's particular situation.
The conditions which may be imposed are limited by the federal constitution, by state constitutional provisions (where applicable), and by statute. The statutory limitations are simplest-they
generally constrain only the period of probation." Constitutional
restraints are more restrictive. Federal courts must stay within the
bounds of the fifth and eighth amendments to the Constitution of
the United States, as must state courts by reason of the fourteenth
amendment." Due process and the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment have been held to impose restrictions on probation conditions. Courts have held that a condition must be related to the
24.
25.
26.
7 which

E.g., Statutes of Michigan, Missouri, and New Mexico.
E.g., Statutes of Arizona, California, and Illinois.
An example of possible terms and conditions is United States Probation Office Form
reads
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
It is the order of the Court that you shall comply with the following conditions of
probation:
(1) You shall refrain from violation of any law (federal, state, and
local). You shall get in touch immediately with your probation officer
if arrested or questioned by a law-enforcement officer.
(2) You shall associate only with law-abiding persons and maintain
reasonable hours.
(3) You shall work regularly at a lawful occupation and support your
legal dependents, if any, to the best of your ability. When out of work
you shall notify your probation officer at once. You shall consult him
prior to job changes.
(4) You shall not leave the judicial district without permission of the
probation officer.
(5) You shall notify your probation officer immediately of any
change in your place of residence.
(6) You shall follow the probation officer's instructions and advice.
(7) You shall report to the probation officer as directed.
27. Similar lists of conditions are suggested by several state statutes: ALA. CODE tit. 42,
§ 22 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2331 (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4332 (1974);
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2711 (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 706-624 (1974); IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-72-1 (Bums 1975); Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-35 (1972); NEa. REV. STAT. § 29-2262 (Supp. 1975).
28. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4333 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.04 (1972); GA.
CODE ANN.

§ 27-2709 (1975).

29. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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rehabilitation of the defendant' and to his crime,3 ' must be medically reasonable,32 and financially practical.33 The theories behind
these constitutional restraints are not clear or consistent, and evaluation of the validity of a particular probation condition may be
difficult.
Most courts express the idea that since probation is a privilege
rather than a right, the only fundamental limitation is that the
sentencing court may not abuse its discretion. 4 However, the problem lies in defining what constitutes such abuse. It is agreed that
the discretion is quite broad, either because probation is an "act of
grace"3 5 or on the contractual theory that since the defendant can
refuse probation he signifies his acquiescence to the conditions by
accepting probation subject to them.3" It must be noted that the
trial court's discretion "is not boundless."37 While some courts have
held probation proceedings exempt from the eighth amendment as
being an avoidance of punishment,3" the general rule is a common
sense application of the fifth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments
to vacate unreasonable conditions while upholding reasonable ones.
State constitutional provisions are similarly applied.39 Since there
is no coherent theory to expound, the limits generally imposed may
best be understood by a series of examples.
Restitution is a widely used condition of probation. As such it
is an ideal point at which to begin. Restitution is a manifestly just
condition of probation in most cases, and it provides one of the few
examples in which the criminal justice system demonstrates any
real concern for the victims of crime. The perpetrator of a corporate
fraud may, for instance, be required to restore to his victims damages to be determined in a civil suit.4 This is true even though the
30. State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 452 P.2d 350 (1969); Ewing v. State, 310 N.E.2d
571 (Ind. App. 1974). The best expression of the requirement, and one widely cited, is given
in People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967).
31. Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971); Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d
981 (9th Cir. 1950); People v. Mahle, 57 Il. 2d 279, 312 N.E.2d 267 (1974); People v. Becker,
349 Mich. 476, 84 N.W.2d 833 (1957).
32. Sweeney v. United States, 353 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1965); see Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
33. United States v. Taylor, 321 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1963).
34. See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
35. Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937); Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935);

State v. Giraud, 68 Wash. 2d 176, 412 P.2d 104 (1966).
36. State v. Smith, 233 N.C. 68, 62 S.E. 2d 495 (1950); see State ex rel. Morris v. Tahash,
262 Minn. 562, 115 N.W. 2d 676 (1962).
37. People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (1967).
38. Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1945).
39. See State v. Barnett, 110 Vt. 221, 3 A.2d 521 (1939).
40. Gross v. United States, 228 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1956).
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existence of a pending civil suit may ultimately lead to double recovery by the victim." The existence of civil liability is not a prerequisite to the imposition of restitution as a probation condition. For
example, violation of a statute against issuing worthless checks may
not require the fraudulent intent necessary for civil recovery, but
restitution is still a valid probation condition."
Restitution becomes invalid when it is no longer truly restitution, but rather a private fine. Examples include cases where restitution is directed toward persons not victims of defendant's crime43
or where it is assessed in fixed dollar amounts unrelated to damages
actually ascertained to have occurred." The basic test in this regard
has been one of due process. Where the criminal trial or a parallel
civil suit has included a hearing on the amount of damage suffered
by the victim, restitution up to that amount has been held valid. 5
The court may exercise discretion in determining the financial
practicality of any such condition, however. 6 Where the defendant
has been given no opportunity to contest the amount of damages,
award of restitution is a denial of due process. Restitution seems to
be the only area of probation conditions which rests on a rational
foundation.
Other frequently used conditions of probation have been those
which order the probationer to avoid the "occasions of sin." The
thief who specializes in hauling his loot away by automobile has
been forbidden to operate a vehicle. 7 The woman beater has been
barred from employing a woman in his business and from allowing
a woman to reside on any farm controlled by him unless she is with
"mentally competent male members of her family."" One convicted
of fortune telling and aiding prostitution has been forbidden to allow
persons to congregate in her house after dark for those purposes."
The bookmaker has been prohibited possession of a telephone. 0 The
41. People v. Stacy, 64 Ill. App. 2d 157, 212 N.E.2d 286 (1965).
42. People v. Ector, 231 Cal. App. 2d 619, 42 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1965); People v. Cruz, 12
Cal. 3d 562, 526 P.2d 250, 116 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1974).
43. Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1950); People v. Mahle, 57 Ill. 2d
279, 312 N.E.2d 267 (1974).
44. United States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894 (1962);
People v. Becker, 349 Mich. 476, 84 N.W. 2d 833 (1957).
45. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
46. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
47. State v. Smith, 233 N.C. 68, 62 S.E.2d 495 (1950).
48. State v. Rogers, 221 N.C. 462, 20 S.E.2d 297 (1942). See also Willis v. United States,
250 A.2d 569 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
49. State v. Davis, 243 N.C. 754, 92 S.E.2d 177 (1956).
50. People v. Stanley, 162 Cal. App. 2d 416, 327 P.2d 973 (1958).
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pornography star has been ordered out of the movie business.', A
"headbuster" in a labor dispute has been forbidden to hold union
office.52 A pediatrician convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior
toward a 10-year-old patient has been ordered to refrain from the
practice of medicine.53
Similar reasoning has resulted in conditions such as periodic
imprisonment,5 4 avoidance of gambling, 5 disclosure of narcotics
source 56 and even the sexual sterilization of a syphilitic rapist in
order to stop the spread of disease and prevent the birth of diseased
children.57
Conditions which are vindictive or the result of a personal quirk
of the trial judge are often struck down. Banishment is not permitted," nor the compulsory giving of blood.59 Likewise sterilization as
a criminal punishment is forbidden precluding its use as a probationary condition."0 The court may not be permitted to condition a
female robber's probation on her having no more illegitimate children,"' nor may it make the author of a false report of police brutality write an essay setting forth the reasons why the police department is entitled to the respect of the citizenry. 2 The key is probably
reasonableness under the circumstances. Further, if the behavior
barred is otherwise legal and not a direct ingredient of the crime for
which the probationer was convicted, the condition should be held
unreasonable on appeal.6 3
51. People v. Bowley, 230 Cal. App. 2d 269, 40 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1964). This decision may
be subject to criticism on first amendment grounds.
52. People v. Oslo, 50 Cal. 2d 75, 323 P.2d 397, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 907 (1958).
53. People v. Frank, 94 Cal. App. 2d 740, 211 P.2d 350 (1949).
54. United States ex rel. Spellman v. Murphy, 217 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1954) (larceny).
55. Barnhill v. United States, 279 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1960) (evasion of federal gambling
taxes).
56. Kaplan v. United States, 234 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 1956) (sale of narcotics).
57. People v. Blankenship, 16 Cal. App. 2d 606, 61 P.2d 352 (1936), authorityquestioned,
People v. Dominquez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967); Guardian of Kemp v.
Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974).
58. People v. Braun, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930).
59. Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1945).
60. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
61. People v. Dominquez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967) (no rational
relation to the crime charged).
62. Butler v. District of Columbia, 346 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Despite the seeming
reasonableness of the condition under the circumstances, the court held that it had "no basis
in our law." Id. at 799.
63. The probation revocation of one convicted of conspiracy to disturb the peace because
of violation of an ordinance which prohibited certain sign posting was held unreasonable and
ordered reversed. This ordinance was regularly and generally neglected by the police department. Therefore, a violation of this ordinance by the probationer could not constitute a
violation of the probationary condition that the probationer conduct himself in a law-abiding
manner. Swan v. State, 200 Md. 430, 90 A.2d 690 (1952).
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D. Medical Treatment
The term "medical treatment" as used here encompasses psychiatric and drug detoxification treatment as well as conventional
medical care. Many jurisdictions, by statute, require medical treatment in particular situations. The most typical statutory cases are
those in which the defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, 4 or in which a narcotics violation 5 or sex offense6 is involved.
All jurisdictions permit medical treatment to be made a condition
of probation and some make it mandatory for narcotics addicts.67
Federal law gives the district court the discretion to offer an addict
the choice between indefinite commitment for treatment (up to 36
months) or jail."6 The defendant is then given 5 days in which to
make his decision.
Since medical treatment is a civil sanction many of the protections of the Bill of Rights are inapplicable. The eighth amendment
has repeatedly been held inapplicable to medical commitment because the purpose is treatment rather than punishment.69 While
equal protection requires that criminal commitment proceedings
satisfy the same standards as civil commitment proceedings,7 ° the
resulting use by criminal courts of civil proceedings in such cases
may make the fifth and sixth amendments inapplicable. 7 While
indefinite commitment of an incompetent defendant pending trial
must be accomplished by civil proceedings, such commitment
64. While commitment of such defendants is optional in many jurisdictions, some make
it mandatory. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 403
(1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503 (1972); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 330.20 (McKinney 1971);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1167 (Supp. 1975). This may seem facially incongruous if the
defendant was insane during the crime but has fully regained his sanity by the time of
trial-especially if his trial is delayed until he regains competency.
65. Some jurisdictions authorize or direct the court to make treatment mandatory rather
than a condition of probation. Such condition may be rejected by electing jail. 18 U.S.C. §
4253 (1970); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-1059, 1060 (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 4765
(1974). Others states make treatment a mandatory condition of probation. S.C. CODE ANN. §
32-1510.57 (Supp. 1975).
66. FLA. STAT. § 917.13 et seq. (1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 426.510 et seq. (1975); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 7-348 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975).
67. See note 65 supra.
68. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2901-06 (1970).
69: Haynes v. Harris, 344 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1965); Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th
Cir. 1964); Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Mo. 1968). See Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
70. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
71. In re Spadafora, 54 Misc. 2d 123, 281 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd mem. 29
App. Div. 2d 742, 288 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1968). But see People ex rel. Stutz v. Conboy, 59 Misc.2d
791, 300 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1969) where the issue of addiction was held one for which a
defendant may demand trial by jury.
72. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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after trial may be ordered by the trial judge. State statutory procedures providing for such commitment have been found to meet the
requirements of equal protection and due process." One of the New
York supreme courts has gone so far as to hold that "[wihere immediate action is necessary . . . for the welfare of the alleged addict," due process does not require a hearing prior to commitment."
The courts appear to handle the medical treatment cases as
administrative law decisions rather than as criminal due process
decisions. In Buchanan v. State75 the court held that denying a jury
trial for an involuntary commitment hearing for a sexual offender
(while allowing it in all other cases) did not deny the defendant
equal protection. The court accepted the state's rationale that in
other cases, commitment was for the protection of the individual
being committed but in sexual offense cases it is society whose
protection is sought. This was found to be a rational relationship
sufficient to support the classification adopted by the legislature.
Due process was not denied by the court, for among other reasons
defendant Buchanan was permitted to have experts testify on his
behalf. The court was more direct in People ex rel. Blunt v. Narcotic
Addiction Control Commission." The court upheld New York's
involuntary addict commitment program on the ground that the
proper procedures in such matters was for experts to decide, not for
the courts. As long as procedures were established and published
and some sort of hearing held before or after commitment, there was
due process. The details were properly left to medical experts and
to the legislature. This reasoning was followed in Sas v. Maryland"
where the court expressly used the police power test and held that
due process does not require any particular process so long as there
is a hearing.
The potential for abuse is enormous. In Sas5 the brief for the
state argued that the purpose of the Maryland Defective Delinquent
Act" was to confine people who are legally sane for periods longer
than the statutes otherwise permit for the crime committed, and
73. Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964); Buchanan v. State, 41 Wis. 2d
460, 164 N.W.2d 253 (1969). At least one state statute has not met these requirements. Spect
v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
74. In re Spadafora, 54 Misc. 2d 123, 281 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd mer. 29
App. Div. 2d 742, 88 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1968).
75. 41 Wis. 2d 460, 164 N.W.2d 253 (1969).
76. 58 Misc. 2d 57, 295 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
77. 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
78. Id.
79. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B (1957). A description of the program under the act is given
by N. KITRiE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY 187-89 (1971).
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that many of the inmates will be effectively confined for life. The
Fourth Circuit cited this passage with approval." One would think
that the rationale of Jackson v. Indiana"'requiring that pre-trial
commitment proceedings adhere to standards as strict as those of
civil commitments would also apply to post-conviction situations,
thus barring results like the one in Sas. Regardless of the verbiage
used by the courts, the end result is forcible confinement and administration of medication. In either case the confinement is for the
defendant's benefit, or for that of society. If it is for the defendant's
benefit, then it is civil in nature, and the full protection of civil
commitment law should be available throughout the process. If it
is for society's benefit, then it is criminal in nature and the full
benefits of the criminal law, including the fifth and eighth amendments, should apply. In either case, the casual police power language, appropriate to zoning violation hearings, is completely out
of place. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will eventually extend the
reasoning of Jackson to cases like Sas. In the interim, the lower
courts seem to prefer the reasoning of Sas.
In a subsequent section" it will be shown that the situation gets
worse rather than better when the defendant attempts to appeal an
order of commitment which he claims may have been proper when
issued, but has since become unconstitutional.
III.

SELECTING THE SENTENCE

When a defendant goes to trial the evidence presented is probably the most vivid influence on the trial judge, though it may not
83
be the most important. Whether or not a defendant goes to trial
the trial court often hears pieces of the State's case during pre-trial
motion practice. Material presented at a hearing on a motion to
suppress evidence can be especially influential since the use of such
a motion can make it seem as though a clearly guilty defendant
seeks to avoid punishment through a "trick." If the "trick" works,
the defendant is ahead-but if he is found guilty anyway he may
pay for the attempt at sentencing. Judges prefer contrition, even if
feigned, to open connivance. 4
80. 334 F.2d at 513.
81. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
82. Section IV.
83. Most defendants do not go to trial-they plead guilty, usually as a result of a plea
bargaining agreement. See, e.g., L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, J. ISREAL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, ch. 20 (3d ed. 1969).
84. Interviews with Florida Parole and Probation Commission Investigators.
[Hereinafter PSI Interviews]. See note 175 infra. The author wishes to thank the Commis-
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After a verdict of guilty the judge is confronted with the task
of sentencing the offender. To announce an appropriate sentence in
every case is difficult. To facilitate this process the court should
have the benefit of total informational input. The current devices
available to the court for this purpose include: the sentencing council; recommendations from the adversaries; and the pre-sentence
investigation.
The sentencing council has been adopted experimentally by
some federal and state courts. The sentencing council permits
judges to exchange ideas on the significance and implications of the
information compiled concerning various defendants prior to sentencing. This technique has not been widely adopted, 6 nor have its
statutory and constitutional limitations been fully explored. 7
Recommendations as to the sentence to be imposed are often
made by the prosecution and defense at the sentencing hearing.
Often these recommendations are not weighed heavily by the sentencing judge because they tend to consist of rather automatic calls
for "toughness" or "mercy." 8 In some cases, however, well thought
out suggestions by counsel may be effective, if only because of their
novelty."9
Many jurisdictions require that a pre-sentence investigation
(PSI) be completed prior to sentencing.'" The PSI involves a thorsion for their cooperation. See also Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on
Judicial Determinationof Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956).
85. Accounts of the relative success of sentencing councils are found in M. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES 70 (1973); Levin, Toward a More EnlightenedSentencing Procedure,45
NEB. L. REV. 499 (1966); 11 AM. CalM. L. REV. 695, 698-700 (1973).
86. Five such jurisdictions are listed in 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 695, 697 nn. 5&6 (1973).
These are all established by local rule of court and not by statute.
87. See 11 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 695, 700-04 (1973).
88. Address by Daniel S. Pearson, attorney, University of Miami School of Law Criminal
Law Seminar, 1975.
89. Although the subject of defense counsel's adequacy in the sentencing process is worth
comment, it is beyond the scope of this article.
90. The PSI is mandatory as indicated in the following jurisdictions: For felonies or
penalties exceeding a stated minimum, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203 (a)-(c) (1972), as amended,
§ 1203 (b) (Supp. 1976); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-102 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
4331 (1974), as amended, § 4331 (a) (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. § 921.231 (1975) (Note however
that FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.710 makes PSI discretionary in felony cases except for first felony
conviction or if the convicted is under 18. FLA. STAT. § 921.231, insofar as it conflicts with
this rule, is unconstitutional; see note 95 infra); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-3-1 to -4
(Smith-Hurd 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4604 (1964); LA. CODE CRIM. P. § 875 (Supp. 1976);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.115 (1964), as amended, ch. 390 Laws of Minn. (1974) creating MINN.
R. CRIM. P. 27.01; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 168-3 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.135 (1973); N.Y.
CRIM. P. LAW § 390.20 (McKinney Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-19-6 (Supp. 1975);
WYo.STAT. ANN. § 7-319 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Oregon allows PSI for sentencing councils, ORE.
REV. STAT. § 137. 077 (1975). The federal government and the state of Alabama make a PSI
mandatory in all cases unless the court shall otherwise direct. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (c)(1); ALA.
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ough investigation of the background of the defendant and the
crime. Where used, it is often the most important influence on the
court's sentencing decision. For example, in the federal courts, the
recommendation of the investigating probation officer is followed
about 80 percent of the time.9 However, the PSI also involves potential for abuse. No rules of evidence govern the contents of the report.9 2 Furthermore, the defendant does not have a constitutional
right to cross-examine witnesses nor even to see the report.93
In Florida the PSI is conducted by the Parole and Probation
Commission." The report is mandatory in Florida for felony convictions, but optional for lesser crimes. 5 A short discussion of the Florida PSI will serve to illustrate the nature of the report.
The report begins with a discussion of the offense charged, and
contains both the official version of what occurred, and the defendant's version of the same events. The status of co-defendants is
also described, as is the defendant's prior criminal record.
The report then provides a comprehensive personal history of
the defendant. The defendant's family history, marital status, education, religious background, military serice, and current employment are included. The report also discusses the defendant's economic status, health, and social behavior, including alcohol and
drug use. Also, evaluations of the defendant by various persons
connected with the offense and the legal system (victim, prosecutor,
defense attorney, law enforcement personnel, etc.) are included'
Finally, the report includes the probation officer's evaluation of
the overall picture and his recommendations, if any, as to sentence
and to conditions of probation. There is also a confidential evaluation to the judge. Its confidentiality" is an important reason for its
significance.
tit. 42, § 21 (1958). See also ABA standards relating to sentencing alternatives and
procedures. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES & PROCEDURES § 4.1, Comment a (Approved Draft, 1968).
91. R. CARTER & L. WILKINS, PROBATION AND PAROLE 140-44 (1970).
92. The absence of limitation is often provided by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1970)
provides:
No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background,
character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the
United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.
93. Such rights, however, may be conferred by statute. E.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.713(b)
(1972) requires disclosure of all factual material in the PSI to both defendant and the state.
94. PSI Interviews, supra note 84.
95. FLA. STAT. §§ 921.213, 948.01 (1975). But see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.710. For a discussion
of the apparent conflict see Rice, Criminal Law and Procedure,49 FLA. B.J. 324, 326 (1975).
96. See note 101 infra, and accompanying text.
CODE
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The foregoing suggests several questions. How is the information obtained and, more importantly, how are the subjective "analyses" and "evaluations" made? What information does the probation officer use and how does he get it? What are defendant's rights
in the matter? Having no rules of evidence to constrain it, a PSI
resembles a police investigation. Parole and Probation aides do
much of the legwork. Aides question relevant sources and compile
the information. Sources are often unidentified in the report, and
hearsay is used frequently. 7 The officers try to confirm the information, but errors are unavoidable; sometimes even malicious misinformation from enemies of the defendant finds its way directly into
the report or indirectly into the evaluations. 8 The degree to which
information is verified depends on the investigating officer's caseload. Often verification is marginal or non-existent." The only protection a defendant has against serious mistakes during the PSI is
access to the report before the sentencing hearing so that errors may
be corrected and reported to the court.
Since the PSI is part of the sentencing process rather than the
trial process, the defendant has no constitutional right to disclosure
or cross-examination. 00 Whatever rights the defendant may have in
this regard derive from statute or rule of court. The usual rule is that
the court may disclose all or part of the PSI report to defense counsel, and if it does so then it must reveal the same material to the
state. 10 ' The general practice is that the court will, on request of
counsel, give a copy of the PSI to both sides prior to the sentencing
hearing except for the confidential report which is not disclosed by
the court. Defense counsel is thus given the opportunity to confirm
the factual matter in the report and may be given some hint as to
the probation officer's sentencing recommendations.
The sentencing hearing is the point at which the sentencing
process reaches its conclusion. 2 At this time the judge has before
him the information from trial, briefs by counsel, and the presentence investigation. He then hears arguments from the lawyers
and the defendant's statement, if any,0 3 before pronouncing the
sentence. The sentencing hearing is a record hearing"' but it is not
97. PSI Interviews, supra note 84.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Williams v. New York, 377 U.S. 241 (1949).
101. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c); FLA. R. CiM. P. 3.713(a).
102. Unless a sentencing council is convened before the hearing. See notes 85-87 supra,
and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1).
104. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.721.
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an adversary hearing in the traditional sense since there is no right
to cross-examine, no rules of evidence to limit the content of statements made at the hearing, and no limitation upon ex parte communications which are allowed to influence the outcome (e.g., the
PSI).105 Counsel for the defense often uses the hearing to reinforce
favorable PSI recommendations or to counter unfavorable ones. The
State's Attorney rarely takes an active part in the sentencing hearing since he has already had substantial input into the trial and the
PSI. He may attempt to counter new defense arguments but will do
little else. Defendant rarely exercises his "right of allocution" absent special circumstances, unless it is to make an apology for the
trouble he has caused. If the defendant finds the imposed sentence
unfavorable his only remedy is appeal.
IV.

APPELLATE REVIEW

The general rule is that sentencing is within the discretion of
the trial court.' ° After conviction, the defendant has no constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses in a sentencing hearing and
the court is not restricted to information received in open court.0 7
The trial judge need not gather any further information about the
defendant than is available in the trial record. There is no constitutional right to a pre-sentence investigation. 8 The convict has no
right to anything less than the statutory maximum penalty. Probation or a suspended sentence are thus an "act of grace."'" Except
in those few states allowing more general review of sentences,"0 the
only question entertained on appeal is whether the sentencing judge
abused his discretion*"'
As noted, a judge's discretion is not boundless." 2 The "abuse
of discretion" formula does permit some appellate review of sentences where probation conditions are concerned."' Apparently it has
105. Williams v. New York, 377 U.S. 241 (1949).
106. See generally Comment, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 181 (1967).
107. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
108. People v. Sudduth, 14 111.2d 605, 153 N.E.2d 557 (1958). Where a PSI is undertaken,
however, it must be substantially accurate. State v. Pohlabel, 61 N.J. Super. 242, 160 A.2d
647 (1960); Ex parte Hoopsick, 172 Pa. Super. 12, 91 A.2d 241 (1952). Where required by
statute, a PSI must be undertaken or the sentence will be subject to review. State v. Culver,
23 N.J. 495, 129 A.2d 715 (1957).
109. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
110. See notes 113-27 infra, and accompanying text.
111. E.g., Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
112. See notes 58-63 supra, and accompanying text.
113. See generally Comment, supra note 106.
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not been held that a judge abuses his discretion by denying probation altogether and ordering instead another statutory penalty or
treatment. The practical result is that any sentence, however inappropriate or unfair, is unchallengeable except under the most outrageous circumstances unless imposed in a jurisdiction offering
broader review.
A few states have permitted appellate review of sentencing decisions for appropriateness as well as for abuse of discretion.", These
states include Alaska, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, and Massachusetts.
In response to the problem evidenced in Bear v. State"' the
Alaska legislature enacted appellate review legislation"' effective
January 1, 1970.11 The new law allows appeal by the defendant to
the supreme court of the state from sentences exceeding 1 year on
the grounds that the sentence was excessive, or by the state on the
grounds that it was too lenient. "' The appeal is a matter of right and
waives the double jeopardy defense as to resentencing. Superior
courts of the state were granted similar jurisdiction over defendants'
appeals from misdemeanor sentences exceeding 180 days.
The Connecticut law establishes a special division of the superior court to hear appeals from sentences exceeding or equal to 1
year."' The authority is used frequently but carefully.2 0
Until 1965, Maine permitted review of all sentences as part of
the general appeals process in criminal cases.' 2' Now there is a special appellate division of the Supreme Judicial Court which has
authority to review prison sentences. 2 It is unclear whether sentences other than prison sentences may be reviewed. The special
court is a three-judge panel selected from the members of the Supreme Judicial Court. No judge may review a sentence which he
imposed.' 3
Maryland formerly permitted review as part of the general
114. See generally ORLAND AND TYLER, JUSTICE IN SENTENCING 70 (1974).
115. 439 P.2d 432 (Alas. 1968).
116. S.L.A. § 5, ch. 117 (1969), amending ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.05.010, 22.05.020(a),
22.15.240(b), adding ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120.
117. See Rehbock, Sentence Appeals in Perspective: The Alaskan Way, 54 JUDICATURE
156 (1970).
118. In an appeal taken by the state the reviewing court is confined to an expression of
approval or disapproval. It may not increase the sentence. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120(b) (1972).
119. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 51-194-96 (1958).

120. Compare State v. Johnson, 21 Conn. Sup. 381, 158 A.2d 746 (1958) with State v.
Rivera, 21 Conn. Sup. 421, 158 A.2d 748 (1958).
121. Ch. 148, § 32, [19541 ME. REV. STAT. (repealed 1965).
122. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2141-44 (Supp. 1965), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
123. Id.
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appellate review and did not distinguish sentence-based appeals
from verdict-based appeals."' Now the law requires that a sentence
be unconstitutional or illegal under statute or common law before
it can be set aside.' This appraoch resembles an "abuse of discretion" standard.
Massachusetts allows appeal to the Superior Court of a district
court sentence. A recent amendment also permits the defendant to
2 6 In either case, the appeal takes the
appeal to a six person jury.
27
form of a trial de novo.
The federal rule regarding review of sentences is found in Fed.
R. Crim. P. 35,128 and in 28 U.S.C. section 2255 (1970). Rule 35 also
allows reduction of sentence by the trial court within 120 days after
receipt of a mandate affirming the judgment, dismissal of the appeal, or denial of review or upholding the judgment by the Supreme
Court. Section 2255 allows an appellate court to set aside or correct
an illegal or illegally imposed sentence.
Amendments to these provi2
'
consideration.'
under
are
sions
If the situation is grim when appellate review of a punitive
sentence is sought, it is worse when review of medical commitment
or compulsory treatment is requested. Of course, if one can prove
that he was sentenced to medical treatment as a punitive measure,
he is entitled to the same rights of appeal as one sentenced in a more
conventional manner. 30 It is difficult, though, to prove that medical
confinement is punitive. In People ex rel. Blunt v. Narcotic Addiction Control Commission' it was held that incarceration of a misdemeanant for longer than the statutory term because he was an
addict was "treatment" even though no treatment in the conventional sense of the word was given' and though he was housed in a
penal facility with non-addicts rather than in a medical facility. The
mere fact that he was convicted under the New York Mental Hygiene Law 3 was sufficient to make the commitment therapeutic
124.
(1973).
125.
126.
127.
128.

MD. ANN. CODE art. 5 § 12-13 (1957), repealed, ch. 2, § 2 Md. Acts, 1st Sp. Sess.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A (1976).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278 § 18 (1972), as amended (Supp. 1976).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3572 (1970). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1970).

129. See HART & WECHSLER, THE JUDICIAL CODE AND RULES OF PROCEDURE IN THE FEDERAL

COURTS 164 (stud. ed. 1973).
130. Cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
131. 58 Misc. 2d 57, 295 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1968).
132. With the exception of a weekly 2-hour "group therapy" session of no medical significance.
133. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (McKinney 1972).
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unless the court could say that the entire mental hygiene program
was utterly without merit.'3
The consequences of a sentence being deemed therapeutic are
severe. Not only does the inmate lose important constitutional protections, 35 but he may lose what few common law rights on appeal
he might otherwise have retained. In Sas v. Maryland'6 the Fourth
Circuit denied habeas corpus relief to a prisoner interred under the
Maryland Defective Delinquent Act.' 37 The court refused to consider
the substantive question of defendant's sanity holding that in such
cases they may only review the procedures used to commit him.
This decision is all the more remarkable since Maryland was a
jurisdiction having, at the time, a broad scope of appellate review
of sentencing.'38
One may argue that judgments of sanity (or drug addiction)
are medical judgments requiring professional expertise and should
be made under administrative procedures with limited judicial
review. This certainly seems to be the predominant practice, but
it is extraordinarily dangerous. How long is the step from eccentricity to insanity? From political nonconformity to eccentricity?
The danger is not so much that we will imitate the Soviet Union by
committing large numbers of political dissenters, "' but that we have

already imitated them by committing a few,"' and that the present

limitations on appeal have made it all too easy to do.
134. The problem is not due entirely to the courts. S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
DILEMMAS OF CRIME at 239 (1967) states:

There is an unfortunate tendency in psychiatry and correctional administration to refer to anything that is done to offenders, even obvious punitive acts, as
treatment. For example, the author once heard a perfectly sincere correctional
administrator refer to the pleasant pastel shades that had been painted on the
walls of an isolation cell as an example of "color therapy." Since the offender is
an unsophisticated person who usually believes that treatment implies something
that is good for him, such misrepresentation is a serious form of dishonesty. To
tell an offender that coercive actions are taken for his own good when it is obvious
that they serve only the needs of an institutional system or society is to treat him
like a sub-human creature to be stripped of all rights and dignity.
It is difficult to overestimate the mischief and damage that are created by
professional dishonesty in the field of criminology. The "double-binded" offender
cannot help but experience rage, distrust and despair, feelings that will perpetuate his criminal behavior. It is not only the criminal who is misled. The public
assumes that when the correctional workers talk about treating the criminal,
something is being done to make him a better and happier citizen.
135. See notes 64-81 supra, and accompanying text.
136. 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964); see notes 77-80 supra, and accompanying text.
137. MD. ANN. ConE art. 31B.
138. See note 124 supra, and accompanying text.
139. See Shapley, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Exchange: Americans Split on Schizophrenia Program,
183 SCIENCE 932 (1974).
140. See. e.g., the case of Mary Kimbrough Jones, a "whistle blower" in the Billie Sol
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V.

SENTENCING UNIFORMITY: THE PRACTICE

141

Sentences handed down by criminal courts are notoriously varied.' 2 Orland and Tyler "3 point out what they call the "five disparities" in sentencing! (1) disparity from judge to judge; (2) disparity
from defendant to defendant; (3) disparity from offense to offense;
(4) disparity from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; and (5) disparity from
federal to state. "' To these might be added: (6) disparity from day
4
to day.' 1
Beginning with the most crucial issue, it is not surprising that
judges differ in their sentencing policies. What is distrubing is that
the differences are so radical and irrational. Frankel"' devotes a
whole chapter to "individualized judges" and gives therein a number of unpleasant examples, one of which should suffice to demonstrate the problem.
The broad experience of former Prison Director Bennet merits
[quotation]. Take, for instance, the cases of two men we received last spring. The first man had been convicted of cashing
a check for $58.40. He was out of work at the time of his offense,
and when his wife became ill and he needed money for rent, food,
and doctor bills, he became the victim of temptation. He had no
prior criminal record. The other man cashed a check for $35.20.
He was also out of work and his wife had left him for another
man. His prior record consisted of a drunk charge and a nonsupport charge. Our examination of these two cases indicated no
significant differences for sentencing purposes. But they appeared before different judges and the first man received 15 years
in prison and the second man 30 days.'47
Estes case related N. KIrrIR, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY
53-54 (1971). Kittrie also describes a case involving the leader of a political fringe group where
an Arlington, Virginia Mental Commission did not permit commitment, but where the mere
raising of the question of commitment posed serious threats to the vitality of the first amendment in what he calls "The Therapeutic State." Id. at 75-77. Other examples may be found
throughout Kittrie's book.
141. See generally K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
142. Several newspaper accounts related in K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT
222-24 (1972) demonstrate that even the general public must have some idea how uneven the
system is.
143. ORLAND & TYLER, JUSTICE IN SENTENCING (1974). This is the report and proceedings
of the sentencing institute of the First and Second Circuits as authorized by 28 U.S.C.
§ 334 (1970).
144. ORLAND & TYLER, supra note 143, at 33.
145. The problem is not peculiar to the United States. The English fare no better. See
R. HOOD, SENTENCING IN MAGISTRATES COURTS (1962).
146. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1973).
147. Id. at 21-22.
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A Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) study 48
showed prison sentence rates (as opposed to probation) for dangerous drug offenses in Los Angeles County, California, ranged from 8
percent to 54 percent and prison rates for robbery ranged from 7
percent to 57 percent depending on the judge sitting. James Bennett, former Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, testifying
before the United States Senate said "some judges are arbitrary and
even sadistic . . . by reason of senility or a virtually pathological
emotional complex.
...
" This seems incompatible with the concept of equal justice under the law. The Fourth Circuit apparently
agrees. In reviewing a bank robbery sentence which it vacated for
reconsideration but reluctantly concluded it could not modify, the
court said "[iut is perplexing that in the same district' another
more violent bank robber and a second offender are treated more
leniently than [defendant]."''
The disparity from defendant to defendant needs little documentation. Practicing lawyers are familiar with judges who are
biased racially, politically, religiously, and otherwise. It should be
unnecessary to give examples. It is necessary to do something about
the problem.'
The disparity from crime to crime is large' but not necessarily
a problem. There may be considerable justification in sentencing
armed robbers more severly than marijuana smokers. The task is to
ensure that the disparity is a reasoned response to the disparate
crimes and not an emotional peculiarity of the judiciary.
The disparity among jurisdictions is also well documented
whether within a state, between states, or between state and federal
courts. The Fourth Circuit has noted "that the Courts of the Eastern District of Virginia are consistently more severe than any other
Fourth Circuit court averaging offense by offense a full year above
148.

Los ANGELES COUNTY-A
(1973).
149. S. Doc. No. 70, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. 311 (1964), cited in FRANKEL, supra note 146,
at 17.
150. The court here inserted a footnote which is worthy of inclusion in full. Since the
note relates more closely to the disparity among jurisdictions, it is cited below. See note 154
infra, and accompanying text,
151. United States v. Bowser, 497 F.2d 1017, 1019 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 857
(1974) (emphasis in original).
152. At least one circuit has made a small step in the correct direction. In United States
v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960) the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held it a denial of equal protection to sentence a minor to a heavier sentence than
his adult codefendants when no discernable difference in their prior records or participation
in the crime could be found.
153. The study by GREENWOOD, supra note 148, shows prison rates ranging from less than
I percent (marijuana) to 26 percent (robbery) for Los Angeles as a whole.
GREENWOOD, PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY DEFENDANTS IN

POLICY PERSPECTIVE
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the standard circuit sentence."'' 4 Similar findings result from studies of state systems.'55
Finally, human variability being what it is, a given judge cannot be expected to be unaffected by his state of health and his
state of mind. It is unreasonable to expect a judge who recently has
been involved in an accident with a drunken driver to sentence a
defendant who drove under the influence in the same way as he
might have prior to his accident. None of us, not even the best of
judges, responds to a given stimulus identically each day.
VI.

SENTENCING UNIFORMITY: THE PROSPECTS

What then can be done to secure some semblance of "equal
justice under law"? There are techniques which may help.
Federal law provides that annual sentencing institutes be held
by each circuit. 5 ' The circuit's trial judges and correctional officers
join legal scholars in discussing problems of sentencing. The purpose is to encourage judges to develop and exchange views on deliberate and objective sentencing policies. These institutes have no
binding authority over any judge but have been of some value nonetheless. 17 The principal value is the exposure each judge gets to the
difficulty he may be creating by his sentencing practices. Occasionally a judge may be persuaded to alter his practices toward the
mean, or at least to make them more internally consistent. Every
state should require frequent attendance at similar institutes for all
criminal trial court judges.
Of much greater impact, where it has been used, is the sentencing council.' Unlike the institute, a sentencing council is not an
academic exercise. Real cases are decided and real sentences imposed according to the decisions. A sentencing council is a meeting
of all the criminal trial judges of a jurisdiction for the purpose of
collectively discussing the sentences to be imposed in pending cases.
154. United States v. Bowser, 497 F.2d 1017, 1019 n.3 (4th Cir. 1974), citing Zumwalt, The Anarchy of Sentencing in the Federal Courts, 57 JUDICATURE 96, 97 (1973).

155. See, e.g.,

GREENWOOD,

supra note 148.

156. 28 U.S.C. § 334 (1970).
157. M. FRANKEL, supra note 146, passim; see DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 33-35 (2d ed. 1969) for a description of the proceedings of a similar institute
in California.
158. See notes 85-87 supra, and accompanying text. Both sentencing institutes and
sentencing councils have the support of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice and the ABA. THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN AFREE SOCIETY, REPORT,
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENF. AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE

145 (1969); ABA STANDARDS

RELATING

TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES §§ 7.1, 7.2 (Approved Draft 1968). The ABA

Standards go on to suggest that judges regularly visit penal facilities in their jurisdictions to
see what they are really doing to those they sentence. Id. § 7.4. The idea is an excellent one.
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Case files are exchanged and each defendant's case is discussed by
the group. The trial judge has the final say, but he is strongly influenced, even pressured, by his fellows on the bench. Sentencing uniformity, if not fairness, is usually achieved throughout the jurisdic1 A particularly valuable function of sentencing
tion.'5
councils is the
breaking-in of new judges who may have little or no experience in
criminal law and corrections.
It has been suggested that sentencing be taken out of the hands
of judges altogether and given to administrative sentencing
boards.9 0 The proposed boards would include psychologists, sociologists, and other professionals whose backgrounds purportedly give
them expertise relevant to the sentencing process. A modified version of this is in effect in California and Washington. In those states
the judge may order probation or a prison sentence, but if he
chooses prison the effective length of the sentence is selected by an
administrative board.'' In practice this has worked no better than
the present system for many of the same reasons.' Board members,
like judges, feel constrained by custom and precedent to follow existing patterns even when they are counterproductive.
Whether sentencing is done by a single judge, a council of
judges, or an administrative board, written reasons should be given
for every sentence. This suggestion, usually credited to Professor
Davis," 3 has a variety of benefits to support it. The mere act of
writing the argument should tend to make judges more deliberate
about sentencing. If one can not justify what one is doing one should
not be doing it. The need to think things through for the purpose of
writing an opinion may make a difference in the outcome of the
case. Second, the expectation that one's judicial peers will hear
about and perhaps even read the opinions will give a judge some
pause before he openly acts in an arbitrary manner. Perhaps the
most important reason for written opinions is the guidance they
could give to appellate courts on review.
Appellate review of sentences is not a widespread practice in
the United States,' 4 but it should be. Sentencing councils can promote uniformity within a district and institutes can encourage a
159. M. FRANKFL, supra note 146, at 70; Levin, Toward a More Enlightened Sentencing
Procedure, 45 NEB. L. REv. 499 (1966).
160. See, e.g., S. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 151 (1962); Hayer, Sentencing by an
Administrative Board, 23 LAW & CONT. PRoR. 477 (1958).
161. CAL. PENAl. CODE §§ 1168, 5077 (1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.010,.040 (1961).
162. See generally Mitford, Kind and Unusual Punishment in California, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, March 1971, at 45.
163. See K. C. DAVIS, supra note 141.
164. See note 106 supra, and accompanying text.
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circuit to adopt uniform policies, but only appellate review can
ensure uniformity on a truly universal basis. It has been argued that
the judicially created rule which bars review of sentences is of questionable legitimacy" 5 but it seems nonetheless that legislative action will be required to break the barrier. The Fourth Circuit noted
wistfully that congressional attempts to enact review statutes have
not yet succeeded.' The Supreme Court of Alaska openly requested
the legislature to create a sentence review body.' The Judicial
Council of Alaska recommended to the legislature a proposal based
on a United States Senate Bill' introduced by Senator Hruska. The
result was the enactment of a statute' expanding the jurisdiction
of the Alaska Supreme Court to allow appeal from sentences exceeding 1 year by defendants on the grounds that the sentence was
excessive or by the state on the grounds that it was too lenient. The
appeal is a matter of right. 70 Perhaps the Alaskan experience is an
indication that the Fourth Circuit is correct. Judicial encouragement for legislative action in this area should continue. The scope
and standards for review may be initially established by statute,'
but will surely evolve with the case law.

VII.

ADMINISTERING THE ALTERNATIVES

The only significant alternative to fine, imprisonment, or medical commitment, is probation, hence this section might well have
been called administering probation. The principles adduced here,
however, probably would be applicable to any foreseeable alternative system.
The problem is enormous. Each year about 1 percent of the
population of the United States is sentenced to prison or probation. 72 When probation is imposed it must be administered. Alfonso
Sepe'" has called the probation department the "key to rehabilita165. See Note, Appellate Review of Sentences and The Need for a Reviewable Record,
1973 DUKE L.J. 1357.
The bar to judicial review is a creation of the courts and cannot reasonably be held more
sacred than any other judicial precedent which has outlived its usefulness.
166. United States v. Bowser, 497 F.2d 1017, 1019 n.2 (4th Cir. 1974), citing S. 1540, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) and S. 716, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
167. Bear v. State, 439 P.2d 432 (Alas. 1968).
168. S. 2722, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1966).
169. Alaska Laws ch. 117 (1969), amending ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.05.020(a), 22.15.240(b),
and adding 12.55.120.
170. See Rehbock, supra note 117.
171. See, e.g., ABA PROJECTION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE-APPELLATE REVIEW OF
SENTENCES (Approved Draft 1968).
172. DRESSLER, supra note 157, at 1.
173. Formerly, Judge of the Criminal Division, Dade County, Florida. For a discussion
of Judge Sepe's creative use of probation, see TIME, Sept. 2, 1974, at 78.
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tion of the criminal justice system."'' 4 Are probation departments
up to the task? The question will be approached through examination of the Florida Parole and Probation Commission.' 75
The theory of probation in Florida is rehabilitation through the
use of community resources. 7 ' The practice is surveillance and deterrence. 7 7 The workload is heavy.
The various duties of a probation officer may include conducting felony and misdemeanor PSI's (the former for circuit courts
only, the latter for all courts); pardon and pre-parole investigations; and post-sentencing investigations for the Parole Board.
Other responsibilities include administering Florida placement
examinations for nonresident convicts relocating therein and investigations of Florida offenders seeking permission to change their
county of residence. Probation officers generally conduct other investigations as requested by courts and other agencies. Of course,
the constant supervision of probationers is also required. 79 An officer typically carries a load of about 100 cases. Because of the large
number of cases there simply is not time to do much rehabilitation.
With their numerous duties and heavy caseload, the officers freely
admit that it is impossible to meet Parole Commission standards.'
Even when time permits a probation officer to attempt to work
with his probationers in a constructive way, the resources available
to him are meager. Drug rehabilitation programs are used as they
become available, but there is no central clearing house for program
information. Each officer keeps his own private file which goes with
him when he leaves. Turnover is high due to low morale, the reasons
for which will be discussed below. Financial aid for probationers is
nonexistent. The Dade County officer of the Probation Commission
once had an employment counselor, but he was promoted to supervisor and not replaced. Legal aid is left to the Bar Association or
Legal Aid Society. The Commission does act as a referral service to
vocational rehabilitation programs, but the lack of a centralized
source of information limits the effectiveness of this function.
Supervision of individual probationers can be close or very
174. Address by Judge Sepe, University of Miami School of Law, Sept. 9, 1974. See also
STANDARDS, PROBATION (Approved Draft 1970).
175. Material for this section was gathered during a series of interviews with Commission
officers and employees. The cooperation of the Commission is gratefully acknowledged.
[hereinafter cited as Interviewsi.
176. See Florida Parole and Probation Commission Procedural Manual, ch. XII (4th ed.
1973).
177. Id., ch. XI.
178. Interviews, supra note 175.
179. Id.
ABA
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loose. A probation officer has almost a free hand in handling each
case. One officer remarked, "I am appalled at how much discretion
I have."'" Due to some of the technical requirements of probation,
for example, the periodic filing of certain documents, many probationers (some of whom may be illiterate) fall into technical violation
of probation conditions. The officer may overlook these violations
or pursue them as the mood strikes him. Even major violations such
as leaving the jurisdiction of the court without permission may be
overlooked in some circumstances. When a violation is reported to
the court, the officer's recommendation of revocation, modification,
or restoration of probation weighs heavily with the court. A probationer does well to keep on the good side of his probation officer, and
there is substantial potential for abuse. Under these circumstances,
the apparent absence of widespread abuse is a tribute to the high
quality of professional conduct of the department's field personnel.
The system ultimately relies on the training, integrity, and
morale of its officers. While their candor during interviews was refreshing, and the probation officers demonstrated a real concern for
their work, there were disturbing questions raised about the levels
of training and morale, at least in Dade County. Generally
probation officers are required to have a degree in criminology, sociology, or psychology, or 3 years of counseling experience. These
requirements are often waived. Most of the probation officers interviewed did not meet the official standards. On the job training is
the rule-there is apparently insufficient time and manpower to
provide formal training for new probation officers.
Working conditions lead to low morale and high turnover. The
hours are often long and irregular. The clients are often less than
endearing. The paperwork is staggering. A supervisor lamented that
his probation officers often spent an hour or more of their all too
precious time waiting for a judge to sign an urgently needed form.
Much of this paperwork may be unnecessary. An experimental project supported by the LEAA concluded that so-called "short-form"
pre-sentence reports were as efficient in misdemeanor cases as full
scale reports, yet were much less time and resource consuming to
prepare."' Many of the forms are redundant. Much of the tabulation
and record keeping could be handled by computers to free human
hands for more human tasks."'2
180. Id.
181.

LIEBERMAN, THE BRONX SENTENCING PROJECT OF THE VERA INSTITUTE

OF JUSTICE

(1972). See also M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS 200-08 (1970).
182. See Blaine, Computer-Based Information Systems Can Help Solve Urban Court
Problems, 54 JUDICATURE 149 (1970).
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Internal conditions are not the only reasons for morale problems. Unenforceable probation conditions frustrate the Commission's work. ' " White probation officers may be expected to supervise
and rehabilitate "ghetto" blacks whose culture is foreign to the
supervising officer."'4 The answers may in part lie in the use of more
people, especially paraprofessionals indigenous to the offender's
community."' ' The "half-way house" institutional program may be
an appropriate and effective alternative to conventional probation
or imprisonment to control objectionable behavior and change the
lifestyle of offenders who, without such programs, would return to
prison or training school.'"' The inability to find jobs for their probationers is particularly frustrating to conscientious probation officers.
Jobs are a major key to successful rehabilitation and yet it is often
government action which makes it difficult for the probationer to
find work. In many cases, restrictive occupational licensing requirements bar offenders from procuring employment and thus function
to encourage probationers to return to the criminal milieu. 7 A Department of Labor research project directed at 16-26 year old defendants charged primarily with economic offenses showed that job
finding services could reduce recidivism by more than 50 percent.' 8
These services included bonding, job placement assistance, group
and individual counseling and remedial education. However, legislative policy of support for such programs is usually minimal.
There is much housecleaning to be done. Thus far focus has
been on the probation officer as the most critical link in the chain
of administration of alternative sentences. The probation officer's
status merits attention. However, he is not alone. Judges, prosecutors, police, and defense attorneys affect the administration of criminal justice as well as performing in their more visible nonadministrative roles.
Judges affect the administration of probation by both action
and inaction. Judges rarely follow-up their cases to see whether the
probation conditions they impose are practical and beneficial.'"
183. Interviews, supra note 175.
184. See Breer, Probation Supervision of Black Offenders, 36(2) FED. PROB. 31 (1972).
185. See FORD FOUND. REP., LAW & JUSTICE 35 (1974); Beless, Use of Indigenous Nonprofessionals in Probation and Parole, 36(1) FED. PROB. 10 (1972).
186. See Schoen, PORT: A New Concept of Community-Based Correction, 36(3) FED.
PRoB. 35 (1972).
187. See Bromberger, Rehabilitation and Occupational Licensing: A Conflict of
Interests, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 794 (1972).
188. Rosow, The Role of Jobs in a Neu' National Strategy against Crime, 35(2) FED.
PRoB. 14 (1971).
189. See generally K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 74 (1971).

19771

SENTENCING ALTERNA TIVES

The result is that probation conditions are imposed that are impossible to supervise or which have no useful effect on the probationer.
One judge forbade a defendant to associate with anyone who rode a
motorcycle. The defendant's probation officer pointed out that to
enforce this he would have to institute full time surveillance on the
defendant to determine each of his associates, and then put fulltime surveillance on each associate to see if he ever rode a motorcycle. "Without full-time surveillance, I couldn't do it, and I simply
couldn't spare the time from my other cases.''190
At least judges are guilty only of benign neglect. Police are
rewarded for felony arrests. Whenever there is a choice between
charging an individual with either a felony or with a misdemeanor,
the pressure is on to charge the felony. Prosecutors are under
similar pressures regarding felonies, and have their won-lost
record to defend. The situation has been so bad as to result in the
following bizarre occurrence: A probation officer sought out a prosecutor to gather information prior to filing for an arrest warrant for
a felony probation violator. The prosecutor begged the probation
officer not to seek the warrant because the violator was not really
guilty of the felony for which he was being probated! "' The probation officer was torn between his statutory duty to seek the warrant
and his sense of justice which told him to let the matter drop. It is
no wonder that many probation officers become discouraged and
look for other types of work.
A further conflict facing the probation officer is the probation
of an "honest" citizen who has committed a technical felony which
he would not have committed had he known of its illegality. Typical
cases involve carrying a concealed firearm' or the improper use of
force or booby-traps in defense of property from malicious trespassers.' Such cases are rarely appealed because of the light sentences
imposed, and remain unreported and unremembered except by the
"criminal." These persons are often not in need of rehabilitation or
supervision, yet they clutter the caseload of the probation department.
The system is understaffed and overburdened. Its task is unpopular and expensive. Those who know its workings often have vested
190.
191.
192.
cially in
193.

Interviews, supra note 175.
Id.
Where the citizen is unaware of what constituted "carrying" or "concealed," especases involving transportation of a weapon in a vehicle this is applicable.
These constitute an assault upon the trespasser.
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interests in it, while reformers are often visibly ignorant of the working constraints on the materials at hand for reform.-" 4

VIII.

COMMENTARY

The sentencing aspect of the criminal justice system leaves
much to be desired. There are five major areas in which improvement can be made: (1) eliminating unnecessary inputs to the system; (2) rationalizing sentencing provisions and procedures; (3) efficiently reorganizing and upgrading the administration of sentences;
(4) making medical commitment a safer, more effective tool; and (5)
implementing widespread judicial review of sentencing. With the
exception of the first" 5 and the last,' each of these areas of improvement will be discussed in detail.
Statutory sentencing provisions, and judicially and legislatively established procedures need rationalizing. Legislatures can
begin by purusing the statutes and deleting all but malim in se
crimes from the ranks of felonies'97 and repealing all criminal penalties that do not directly benefit society.' For those acts which remain criminal, there should be a wide range of alternatives to incarceration or prolonged probation.' Alternatives might include corporal punishment,"'" reparation and multiple damages,'' assignCRIME OF PUNISHMENT ch. 6 (1971).
195. This is a whole topic in itself. The system is overburdened and understaffed. Each
person diverted from the system represents a saving of resources. The prevailing philosophy
of the criminology community recognizes that we should legalize that behavior which we have

194. See, e.g., K. MENNINGER, THE

previously outlawed because we disapprove of it, butwhich is harmless to all but those who

willingly participate, to wit: (1) gambling; (2) consensual sex crimes including prostitution
and homosexuality; (3) the use of nonaddictive drugs, with the usual restrictions as presently
applied to the use of alcohol (e.g., it will remain illegal to operate a motor vehicle while under
the influence); and (4) violating "blue laws." This admittedly may be politically difficult. A
more palatable course for reelection minded legislators might be to remove the aforesaid
crimes from the arrest-trial-jail-probation format and punish them in the manner of traffic

violations-by citation and fine. This compromise would be a substantial step in the proper
direction and would ease the caseload of the probation department considerably. See generally N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL (1970).
196. This is discussed in detail supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
197. E.g., selling liquor to Indians, 18 U.S.C. § 1154 (1970); vandalism of a mailbag or
box, 18 U.S.C. 88 1705-06 (1970); maintaining improper doors on a public building, FLA. STAT.
§ 823.06 (1975); bookmaking, FLA. STAT. § 849.25 (1975); molesting a parking meter (2d
offense), FLA. STAT. § 877.08(4) (1975).
198. E.g., jail sentences for selling wild flowers, FLA. STAT. § 865.06 (1975). The federal
Endangered Species Act of 1973 at least gives the court the option of civil fines rather than
jail. 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (Supp. III, 1973).
199. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 2.1(b)
(Approved Draft 1968). See HEW, OFFICE OF JUVENILE AND YOUTH DEVELOPMENT, L. Empey,

Alternatives to IncarcerationPart 111 (1967).
200. See Balser v. State, 57 Del. 206, 195 A.2d 757 (1963) (whipping). The current
statutory trend is hostile to corporal punishment. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3564 (1970).
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ment to a "half-way" facility," 2 or release in the custody of a bonded
guardian. These should be accompanied by the repeal of laws divesting convicts of their civil rights, especially those rights pertaining to securing licenses for employment. Potential employers could
be protected in this regard if the nature and purpose of the employment of licensed personnel demanded disclosure of the employee's
criminal record.""13 Multiple or violent offenders might be barred
from professions requiring posssssion and use of firearms. Otherwise
there should be as few restrictions as possible.'"4
In the same manner, the legislature should encourage judges to
sentence merely technical offenders, who are good risks based on the
pre-sentence investigation, to unsupervised probation. This should
be done even in felony cases if the crime is truly technical in nature
and the defendant has strong ties to the community, indicating the
likely success of such a course of action. This avoids burdening the
probation officer with unnecessary supervisory and surveillance
work, and frees resources to deal with serious offenders requiring
closer attention.
Administration of sentences needs to be efficiently reorganized
and upgraded. The paperwork blizzard must be dissipated. Use of
short forms where possible, or even no forms in some cases, is advisable. Files and record keeping should be computerized. Passwords
and other forms of file protection can assure confidentiality to a
degree greater than that possible with hard copy records.'" 5 The
computer also can be used to service a centralized clearinghouse for
201. The most familiar damages statute may be 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), the antitrust,
treble damages section. This is denominated "civil," but the label does not change its substance or utility. See generally 24B C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2007 (1962). See also, Fogel,
Restitution in Criminal Justice: A Minnesota Experiment, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 681 (1972).
202. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 2.4
(Approved Draft 1968). These could probably be built and operated at much less cost and
with a lower recidivism rate than conventional prisons. See, e.g., Markley, Furlough Programs and Conjugal Visiting in Adult CorrectionalInstitutions, 37(1) FED. PROa. 19 (1973);
Rudoff & Esselstyn, Evaluating Work Furlough: A Follow-Up, 37(2) FED. PROB. 48 (1973);
Root, State Work Release Programs: An Analysis of OperationalPolicies, 37(4) FED. PROS.
52 (1973); N. KrTrRIE, supra note 140, at 241.
203. The legend on a security guard's license might include a notation to the effect that
the licensee had been convicted of robbery on (date) and had finished serving his sentence
on (date).
204. This specifically includes the practice of law. There is no reason to suppose that a
truly reformed ex-convict would be less fit to practice law than someone selected at random
from among the members of the bar.
205. The computer systems literature is rich with various methods of preserving system
security, and with analysis of costs of the respective methods. For example, both technical
details and economic analysis of several schemes may be found in a collection of three back-

to-back papers in 17
(1974).

COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY

437-49
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community service and employment information.
The procurement information of a high-speed disk memory and
time-shared remote terminal system would furnish every probation
officer in the department with ready access to a full library of community resource information indexed by location, function, special
requirements, and even by success rate. 06 The cost of an equivalent
measure-hiring additional staff-would be prohibitive, whereas
the cost of a proper data handling system would be quite practical. 07
The use of indigenous and other paraprofessionals, especially
ex-convicts, should be expanded.'0 " These people may be able to
help bridge the wide cultural gap that exists between the literate,
educated probation department staff and the often illiterate, unschooled, but streetwise probationer. Where volunteer probation
counsellors have been used, results have been mixed. Some studies
report reductions in institutionalization and repeat offense rates,10
while other studies have failed to detect any statistically significant
effect.2 "1 The studies generally have not dealt with paraprofessionals
having formal probation training. Thus, it would seem reasonable
to conclude that better results should be expected when trained
personnel are used. Junior college programs in criminology might be
profitably expanded to include penology. This would permit generation of a community pool of trained paraprofessionals.
As the probation department's capabilities are enlarged
through the addition of personnel and hardware, legal and economic
aid programs for probationers should be developed. Keeping first
offenders out of further trouble is often a matter of keeping them
out of the situation that first got them into trouble. Quite often such
a situation is a financial or minor legal problem like a domestic
squabble. If the probationer knows there is help available from the
probation office, there will be less temptation for him to seek extra206. The problems generated by the computer systems, especially invasion of privacy,
are also discussed frequently in data processing literature. E.g., Report of the ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, A Problem-List of Issues Concerning Computers and
Public Policy, 17 CoMM. A.C.M. 495-503 (1974); Sterling, Guidelines for Humanizing Computerized Information Systems: A Report from Stanley House. Id. at 609-13.
207. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
REPORT, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOc.Y 68-79 (1967) for a discussion of uses, costs, and potential
problems of automated criminal justice information systems.
208. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

165-66 (1967).
209. Scheier, The Professional and the Volunteer in Probation: An Emerging

REPORT, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY

Relationship, 34(2) FED. PROB. 12-18 (1970); Leenhouts, Royal Oak's Experience with
Professionals and Volunteers in Probation, 34(4) FED. PROB. 45-51 (1970).
210. E.g., Lonegan, Impact of the Volunteers in Probation Program on Probationers, 1(2)
J. VOILUNTEERS WITH DELINQUENTS 23-32 (1972).
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legal solutions to his problems.
The development of new programs should be accompanied by
careful evaluation of each program. Computer facilities will allow
sophisticated statistical techniques to be used to determine the
effectiveness of each program. These same techniques should be
applied to probation conditions judicially imposed. The results
should be used to guide the probation officer in making his recommendations in the PSI report. Annual summaries of these results
(omitting judges' names) should be presented to the legislature and
to any sentencing institutes or councils convened in the probation
department's jurisdiction.2" Finally, it must be recognized that not
all offenders need rehabilitation. The marijuana smoker may need
education about the possibly dangerous effects of drug usage, but
he is not necessarily antisocial and probably does not require counseling. Unsupervised probation would often be an appropriate sentence. If society insists on stopping the use of marijuana, then it may
need to provide surveillance-but not rehabilitation. The same is
true of the conscientious draft dodger, some tax evaders, homosex-

uals," 2 many regulation violators, and technical criminals. There is
no sense spending a counselor's time with these offenders when
there are others on probation more in need of help.
Medical commitment" ' has great potential for good and for
evil. This paradox involves taking advantage of the good while forestalling the evil. If medical treatment is not used to defeat the
constitutional and statutory rights of certain individuals,"' and becomes a safeguarded alternative for truly therapeutic purposes,
good will naturally follow. 2"' The thrust of this examination is to
suggest safeguards which are readily created."'
The first safeguard should be that mentally competent
defendants not be forced to take treatment of any kind. The state
211. The value of research findings in improving the success rate in probation is
DRESSLER, supra note 157, at 152-58.
212. See, e.g., N. KIrrRIE, supra note 140, at xviii.
213. Mental health law is a complicated field which is obviously beyond the scope of this
comment; however, an overview is necessary.
214. See notes 78-80 supra, and accompanying text. See also Wexler, Therapeutic
Justice, 57 MINN. L. REV. 289, 295 (1972).
215. For a commentary which argues that involuntary treatment has no place whatsoever in a free society, see Szasz, The Danger of Coercive Psychiatry, 61 A.B.A.J. 1246
(1975).
216. The term "readily" does not imply political feasibility but only technical feasibility.
Some psychiatric professionals see legal due process as a medical inconvenience and might
well make it difficult to pass the needed legislation however much it is needed. See, e.g., the
discussion in N. KITrRIE, supra note 140, at 79-95. Safeguards generally are discussed in N.
KITriE, at 307, 362 et seq. and 400 et seq.

discussed in
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may isolate them" 7 or imprison them for the statuory period for

their crimes, but it may not forceably treat them.2"' The second
safeguard should be the appointment of a legal guardian in a civil
proceeding for mentally incompetent defendants. The guardian's
written consent would be required before any treatment could be
given the defendant. Furthermore, the guardian should be legally
liable, as a fiduciary, to the defendant for the consequences of the
treatment. The third safeguard should be the abandonment of the
proposition that medical commitment is not akin to imprisonment.
The Bill of Rights should apply in full to all criminal proceedings,
whether punitive or therapeutic. The critical thing to remember is
that the awesome power of a modern government is being focused
to confine one of its citizens against his will. What the process is
21

called is immaterial.

9

If improvement can be made in the five areas set out at the
beginning of this section by the means suggested or by any other
practical means, society will benefit. Lower cost and lower crime
rates are desirable goals for the criminal justice system, and upgraded sentencing mechanisms are essential to those goals.
217. E.g., to prevent the spread of a communicable disease.
218. Indeed, the dichotomy between traditional institutional "treatment" and "no treatment" may be false. Therapeutic use of "half-way" and "community" facilities during proba-

tion can be quite valuable. See N. KITrRIE, supra note 140, at 163-64, regarding this technique
as applied to juveniles.
219. This reasoning was essentially followed in regard to the rights of juveniles in juvenile
court proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966). The medical community can also do its
share by adopting upgraded ethical standards. See HALLECK, supra note 134, at 238-44 for
suggested standards and the reasons for them. See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Schwitzgebel, Limitations on the Coercive Treatment of Offenders, 8 CRIM. L. BULL.
267 (1972).

